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Levine’s explanatory gap presents qualia (and their mysteriousness) as the main sticking 
point in the materialism anti-materialism debate. This paper makes the claim that 
materialists should not only strive to naturalize qualia in their theories but also explain why 
they seem so mysterious in the first place. The paper attempts to provide one such explanation 
of said mysteriousness. The materialist picture painted is hoped to give materialism a 
foundation upon which it can bridge the explanatory gap (and possibly defend itself against 
Kripkeʼs modal argument against forms of materialism). The picture will ultimately be that 
our ability to introspect, that is, our “inner-sight” if you will, is a blind-innersight, 
analogous to the known condition, blind-sight. If this picture is correct (i.e. it agrees with 
neuroscientific findings) then it is to be believed it will handily serve the materialist’s 
explanatory needs. 
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My goal in this paper will be to guard materialism against Levine’s explanatory gap as well 
as, in passing, Kripkeʼs modal argument. First, to outline my hurdle: as elaborated by Levine, 
the explanatory gap is to be understood as a failing of materialism to satisfactorily capture 
qualia in physical terms. When supplied with a full theory of the motions of molecules, the 
identity “heat = motion of molecules” appears to fully explain the phenomena we call heat. 
Heat is fully intelligible in physical terms; there is nothing that is left mysterious about heat 
after we have given our explanation of it in terms of the motion of molecules.1 I think we can 
agree with Levine that this does not appear to be true with an identity such as “pain = C-fiber 
firing”. We can concede that a complete theory of C-fiber firings might fully explain the 
causal role of pain: the identity helps explain an important aspect of the phenomena we call 
pain.2 But it does not capture everything, says Levine: it utterly fails to explain “why pain 
feels the way it does!”3 This aspect of pain, the “qualitative character”, or quale of the 
sensation, is left “completely mysterious”.4  
 
The bottom line is that qualia seem unintelligible in physical terms.5 And the options 
for getting around such a difficulty are few. I believe Levine’s paper does a fair job of 
suggesting what these options are. These are to either attempt to reduce qualia down to 
some trivial entity or deny their existence entirely6; posit qualia as brute facts of certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Joseph Levine, “Materialism and Qualia: the Explanatory Gap”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, no. 64 (1983): 357. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 358. 
6 Ibid., 360. 
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physical phenomena, accepting their unintelligibility7; or accept the task of making qualia 
intelligible in physical terms.8 I believe neither of the first two solutions are appealing. The 
first is immediately unappealing in that it will have us attempt to unforgivingly destroy or 
dissolve a rather persistent concept in the literature. Besides this, I personally feel at least 
some pull towards qualia. The second solution would leave materialism as equally 
uneconomical and unparsimonious as epiphenomenalism: this would be to leave 
materialism without its primary appeal in my opinion. The third solution would be my choice 
then: the materialist should accept there is constructive work to be done. The only problem 
is, this seems to be an incredibly weighty task, a task that many philosophers have no doubt 
already laboured upon: I am out of my depth – unless there is another way of looking at the 
problem. I propose a fourth way out for the materialist: instead of trying to make qualia 
strongly intelligible in materialist terms, why not accept their mysteriousness but account for 
this mysteriousness in the materialist picture.  
 
In all truth, this “fourth solution” can be subsumed under the third solution: I am 
simply construing “intelligible” very narrowly here, to mean something like “not at all 
mysterious”. Really, my fourth solution will still make them intelligible in the broad sense of 
“explainable”, only now I am explicitly committed to making the prima facie mysteriousness 
also explainable. For the sake of clarity going forward, I will fix my interpretation of 
“intelligible” to the broad sense. Besides the obvious rhetorical flourish of conjuring up a 
“fourth solution”, I have elaborated all this in an attempt to highlight a difference in 
approach: instead of starting with the belief that qualia truly are intelligible and working to 
prove this, I wish to start by conceding that qualia truly feel mysterious in some manner and 
that materialists should seek first and foremost to find a picture that will account for this 
feeling of mysteriousness. This latter approach, I believe, is a little more charitable to those 
of us who are “qualia freaks”, as Jackson puts it9, all the while opening the door to making 
qualia intelligible: I do not think we can truly demystify this concept unless we also provide 
an account of why it was so mysterious in the first place.  
 
In accordance with this approach, my goal will be to propose a picture that adheres 
to materialism yet provides a satisfying account of why qualia feel so mysterious, thus 
clearing a path towards filling the explanatory gap and making qualia intelligible in purely 
physical terms. I start by trying to give the idea of qualia some weight in the mind, giving the 
“qualia freaks” the benefit of every doubt. I do so in my own (prolix) fashion, naturally 
leading to my proposed picture. This lead-up is not essential to my solution – it merely sets 
the stage for it, providing background. Ultimately, I think we will find that my picture is really 
rather simple – but then, if a simple solution works, why not take it?  
 
Before setting out to paint this picture, a word on Kripkeʼs modal argument; just as 
Levine suggested10, I believe we will be able to dismiss the modal argument once we have 
provided a picture that can fill in the explanatory gap. The import of my particular picture on 
Kripkeʼs argument will be briefly discussed at the end of the paper.  
Let me start with this: what can we say theoretically about qualia? It seems even the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 357. 
8 Ibid., 358. 
9 Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia”, The Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 127 (1982): 127. 
10 Levine, 357 
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most basic theoretical claims we can make of it (such as, what kind of entity it is) will be 
contentious.11 I cannot hope to defend such claims in nearly as much depth as the many 
philosophers who have already probed the notion of qualia. But with no clearly accepted 
theory of qualia at hand, how am I to begin? Well, by first remarking said lack of consensus.  
Qualia and its qualities, I think we can all agree, are very difficult to articulate. Their 
mysteriousness then, at least in the sense of their resistance to clear articulation, is a 
problem for theorists of all stripes.  
 
Let me retreat further back then: how do we speak of qualia in everyday speech?12 
When we say, pointing at some pie, “this tastes like apple pie” we are able to articulate that 
we think this because it is sweet and a bit tart with a nice soft chunky feel and so on. When 
we say “this is what it is like to taste apple pie”, where do we point and what can we 
articulate? Perhaps this is my own failing but I truly cannot articulate anything concrete 
about why I think “this is what it is like to taste apple pie” in any way analogous to the first 
case, nor do I feel inclined to point at anything in particular. Others I have talked to similarly 
draw a blank. Besides a recognition that were in some way speaking of “the feel” of the 
experience, nothing else can be immediately said. Smartʼs suggestion that we talk of this 
“feel” in roundabout “topic-neutral” ways13 only further suggests to me the mysteriousness 
of the subject.  
 
Are we doomed to quail before the quale forevermore? No. I believe there is at least 
one interesting and analyzable manner in which we talk about the qualities of our 
experiences: through metaphors and similes, or perhaps more generally, associations and 
disassociations. This is not quite the same as Smartʼs topic-neutral talk, which seemed 
heavily focused on the physical circumstances that normally bring about the sensation in 
question. I want to speak of associations more broadly: something more akin to “what it is 
like to experience x is what it is like to experience y”. If we can make these kinds of 
associations (or disassociations), it would suggest there is some kind of commonality 
between x and y that makes the association possible.  
 
The notion of an association is a very broad notion: I should take a moment to 
nuance my use of it. Clearly there are different sorts of associations. The two broad 
categories that I will outline are the following: first, what we might call “external associations” 
and second, what we might call “psychological associations”. Roughly speaking, the first is 
any kind of association that is made on the basis any kind of commonality between the 
relata, considered from a Gods eye perspective. An example of this would be the simile 
“apples in the orchard look like Christmas ornaments” if the simile is justified by a statement 
like “...because they are both round, red, attached to a tree and about the same size”. Again 
roughly speaking, the second sort of association is one made on the basis of some internal 
psychological association between the relata. An example of this would be Pavlov’s dog 
thinking to itself “the sound of the bell sounds like dinner time”. I distinguish these two sorts 
of associations really just to set one aside: I am not interested with psychological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Michael Tye, "Qualia." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2016 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/qualia/>. Intro. 
12 To take such an approach is perhaps contentious in itself, but I think it will lead to some interesting ideas and so is justified. 
Anyhow, I have to start somewhere. 
13 J. J. C Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes.” Reprinted in Chalmers, David John. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and 
Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 64. 
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associations between introspected qualia but instead with external associations made 
between qualia. I want to find examples of us grasping properties or characteristics intrinsic 
to the qualia in question, not examples of us making associations based on arbitrary or 
extrinsic properties of the qualia. From here on out, by default I use the term “association” to 
mean “external association”.  
 
We saw that in the case of a simile between perceptions, such as “apples in the 
orchard look like Christmas ornaments”, a justification for the simile was at hand. In other 
words, the commonality brought out was easily articulated. Is there an analogous 
justification for similes or metaphors about introspected qualia? If we can find clear cases of 
external associations between qualia, then there should be a commonality to be articulated. 
But in every case that I have encountered, it appears to me we are unable to articulate a 
concrete commonality between the introspected qualia.  
 
To support this opinion, let me briefly consider a few metaphors we might find in 
common speech. I will begin, in keeping with theme: “to taste freshly baked apple pie is to 
taste home and hearth”. In less poetic terms, we might translate this as “what it is like to 
taste apple pie is like what it is like to be at home or at least feel at home”. This metaphor 
does not seem to be any good. To boot, the experiences of feeling at home or being at home 
are extremely nebulous experiences (at least in comparison to the experience if tasting 
apple pie). Moreover, this looks suspiciously like a psychological association: we might justify 
the metaphor with a statement like “I have many fond memories of eating apple pie at 
home”. Let us try a different metaphor: “this pain is sharp and pointy” or “the character of 
this particular pain I am experiencing is what it is like to experience touching sharp and 
pointy objects”. This is already much better as the relata are much narrower. However, we 
might worry this is still a psychological association: it seems the metaphor will be justified by 
the fact that whenever we touch sharp and pointy things, it often gives rise to an experience 
of pain. If we are charitable though, this metaphor might work: we also might justify the 
metaphor by saying those pain experiences caused by sharp pointy objects are somehow 
similar to the particular pain experienced now. Somehow the qualitative character of the 
experiences are similar – although similar in just what way, I would find it difficult to 
articulate (excluding mundane physical characteristics such as the duration of the 
experiences – these do not seem to be the properties we are interested in when we talk of 
the feel of an experience). Whether such a metaphor is truly good enough remains 
debatable but I think we can agree we are getting closer. I actually think finding an 
acceptable association is very difficult: I believe the most likely candidates for study are in 
fact disassociations such as “what it is like to see a colour photo is not what it is like to see a 
black and white photo”. The fact that we are able to distinguish between two sorts of 
experiences in the first place shows that, speaking in qualia- friendly terms, we can at least 
mark where there is a lack of commonality between two quale. However, to try to concretely 
articulate what makes them different, again, leaves me bewildered. Perhaps this is a 
personal failing but going forward, I have to assume it is common. In short though, if we are 
to be charitable to qualia advocates,14 we seem to have an ability to distinguish and 
associate qualia but we cannot explain why we make the distinctions and associations we 
make.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 If we were to try to outright deny that we make any truly external associations or disassociations of qualia, I suspect we could only 
do so by seriously reducing qualia down into much more trivial or brute entities. 
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How do we make sense of all this? Materialists and non-materialists alike will have 
some explaining to do. It seems as though our ability is auto-magical: we perform such 
associations instinctively, but cannot give any justifications for why we make them the way 
we do. For an epiphenomenalist, the story might go as follows: “look, all this suggests that 
there are laws that just make these relations hold and that our mind is just able to grasp 
these relations, precisely by those same laws”. I cannot be sure this is what advocates of 
epiphenomenalism would say, but there is at least the threat that even more phenomena 
will have to be added to the list of “nomological danglers”.15 For the materialist on the other 
hand, the task seems a bit harder: not only will she have to explain the prima facie auto-
magical character of this ability, but also turn the ability into something intelligible in 
physical terms. In other words, she will have to convince us there are justifications for these 
associations and they are articulable in physical terms. Though the task may be bigger, so is 
the reward: in explaining away the auto-magical character I believe she will have done a 
great deal to explain away the mysteriousness of qualia.  
 
What story will the materialist tell then? The one that presents itself to me as the 
most obvious and clarifying will be one in which the auto-magical ability becomes instead an 
automatic, unconscious ability. The idea is this: just as some have the condition of blind-
sight, we all have blind-innersight. Through perception we are aware of external objects, 
allowing us to react and interact with external objects; through introspection we are aware 
that we are perceptually aware of external objects, allowing us to consider our sensations, 
which includes associating and distinguishing them. But this is as far as it goes: we have no 
higher level system that makes us aware that we are introspectively aware of what we are 
perceptually aware of. We have impressions of apple pie (the sensation of apple pie taste), 
we have impressions of our impressions of apple pie (the introspection of the sensation of 
apple pie taste) but we do not have impressions of impressions of our impressions of apple 
pie. Our introspective system (or reflexive system if preferred16) reports on our perceptual 
system (which reports on external systems), thus allowing us to articulate just how we 
associate, distinguish and categorize external objects we are perceptually aware of. But we 
have no higher system that reports on our introspective system. In theory, such a system 
would allow us to articulate just how our introspective system associates, distinguishes and 
categorizes sensations we are aware of through the introspective system. Such a higher level 
system would probably be, evolutionarily speaking, overkill. If sensations are identical to 
brain states, as the identity theorist would have it, then this theoretical higher system would 
allow us to articulate some physical properties of these brain states depending on what 
metrics our introspective system might use to associate and distinguish sensations (i.e. the 
brain states the introspective system reports on). This is the precise image I have in mind – 
but let me do a little more story-telling to explain just why I believe this image is so powerful 
in the hands of a materialist.  
 
Imagine a creature that has an underdeveloped introspective system. Such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid., 61 
16 If we prefer not to use terms that are already theory laden, we can replace “introspective system” with “reflexive system”. I will use 
both, emphasizing my loose use of the term “introspective”.  
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creature would not be reflexively aware that they are aware of external objects17, or at least 
only to a very limited extent, depending on how underdeveloped their reflexive system is. 
Basic robots that very simply respond to visual stimuli could be considered such creatures. 
Jellyfish, in so far as they very automatically react to differing light stimuli could also be 
considered an example of such creatures. However, I will need something with a brain for 
this story: I will use goldfish, tentatively assuming they are not highly capable of becoming 
aware of what they are perceptually aware of. Now, normal people, I assume, do not ask 
themselves how they manage to introspectively distinguish and associate sensations. 
Similarly, normal goldfish, I assume, do not ask themselves how it is possible that other 
goldfish perceptually distinguish, say, predators from food (evolutionarily speaking, these 
would probably be pretty useless thoughts). But just as there are odd philosophers of mind, 
we might imagine some odd goldfish that do ask themselves these questions: call one such 
aquatic philosopher, Goldie. In so far as Goldie can distinguish goldfish from other animals 
and plants, in so far as she can recognize that these goldfish behave in a pattern-like manner 
(fleeing from predators but making b-lines for food), in so far as Goldie is curious about what 
mechanisms must be in place to explain this phenomenon (this is the philosophical 
personality of Goldie) and finally, in so far as Goldie’s brain is capable of some basic 
reasoning, it is conceivable that Goldie might reason to the conclusion that goldfish have 
perceptual systems that let them distinguish predators from food. This will be a revelation to 
her: she will not know this intuitively, precisely because she has no internal system that 
reflexively reports on her perceptual system. She just distinguishes external objects 
automatically, unaware of the basis upon which she does so. She might even have some 
mysterious notion of the qualitative character of “what it is like to look like seaweed” or 
“what it is like to look like a goldfish”: she would be unable to articulate that seaweed is 
green, tall and thin while goldfish have a small, white and orange body with wavy translucent 
parts attached (their fins). Nevertheless, we can agree that Goldie’s lower level perceptual 
system (whose workings she is blind to) is distinguishing objects in her visual field based on 
characteristics at least somewhat like these. From Goldie’s perspective though, these 
characteristics that she may have identified by doing her science of perception, will seem 
completely unrelated to her utterly mysterious notion of the qualitative “look” of these 
external objects.  
 
However, after pondering long about all this, she might finally accept a story similar 
to the one I have told, on the basis that it is the most economical story that accounts for the 
observable phenomena while also at least accounting for why these qualitative “looks” seem 
mysterious and unintelligible in physical terms. These “looks” feel mysterious, and will 
probably always feel mysterious, because these naturally arising concepts have little weight 
or connectivity with other concepts in her conceptual network. These concepts of the “looks 
of certain external objects” arise automatically and their roots are invisible to her. She will 
only be able to fully understand and articulate these “looks” in a roundabout manner – 
namely by completing a very lengthy and third-personal account of goldfish perception 
systems. And she will no doubt have a very difficult time properly drawing the connection 
between her nebulous naturally occurring concept of “what it is like to look like a goldfish” 
with her concrete description of what goldfish look like, elaborated in terms of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Armstrong et al., Consciousness and Causality. Humans are sometimes like these creatures. The case of the long-distance truck 
driver, driving on “auto-pilot” is one example. I believe those with blind-sight are another example, with respect to their visual 
systems. 
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characteristics her perception systems use to distinguish goldfish. Her naturally occurring 
concept will be very vague but something intimate, while her concrete description will be 
rather precise but very foreign and far removed from her. Nevertheless, if she tells herself a 
story like the one I have just told, she might come to believe that marking a strong 
correspondence18 between the concepts, is indeed the most sensible thing to do, dismissing 
the apparent mysteriousness of these “looks” as an artifact of her having blind-sight. Both 
concepts, she might tell herself, refer to the same thing namely, certain physical properties 
of goldfish and seaweed that her perception systems pick up on.  
 
Of course everything I have just said could apply analogously to humans: I would 
suggest we have some kind of blind-innersight (or blind-reflexive-sight if preferred) and the 
mysteriousness of our qualia is an artifact of the blindness of this innersight. Our reflexive- 
sight has developed so as to distinguish and parse our inner states such that we can now 
perform certain actions (e.g. articulate why we categorize certain perceptions the way we 
do). However, because we are not naturally privy to how this innersight functions, the 
naturally arising concept of the qualitative character of an experience, is rather weightless 
and of a limited role in our conceptual network. Because we are not naturally privy to how 
this innersight functions, qualia and why we distinguish them the way we do, becomes a 
mysterious topic, with qualia becoming nearly impossible to articulate in concrete terms.19  
 
Meanwhile, we have done our science and proposed certain concrete descriptions of 
our inner brain states. If my story is correct, it is perfectly acceptable to mark a strong 
correspondence between our naturally arising concepts and some of our concrete 
descriptions of inner brain states: the descriptions elaborated in terms of the characteristics 
that our reflexive systems use to distinguish inner brain states. I would claim that the 
foreignness of these descriptions and the seeming incongruity of connecting them with our 
naturally arising intimate concepts has been satisfactorily explained by my materialist 
picture here. Said foreignness and incongruity can no longer be used to attack materialism.  
 
My story is complete. Briefly, I want to consider the import of this story on Kripkeʼs 
modal argument against Identity Theory, as elaborated in Naming and Necessity. As Levine 
suspected, now that I have at least the foundations for bridging the explanatory gap, I 
believe that I will also be able to dismiss Kripkeʼs objection to identity theory.  
 
Recall, Kripkeʼs argument hinges on the premise that the identity theorist is 
incapable of furnishing an explanation of why the identity “pain = C-fiber firing” appears to 
be contingent, when in fact, if true, it must be necessarily true. For other necessary identities 
that appear prima facie contingent, such as “heat = motion of molecules”, the following 
explanation is available: it appears contingent simply in virtue of our being able to imagine 
circumstances under which sensations qualitatively identical to sensations of heat might 
arise, though they would be caused by something other than true heat. Or in other words, 
we can imagine scenarios in which arise within us, qualitatively identical epistemic states to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 I am not sure I can say the concepts are to be identified with one another, at least in any very strong sense: it seems they will always 
be numerically distinct concepts, given the different weights these concepts have in our conceptual networks and given that one is 
intimate and naturally arising while the other is foreign and removed. By using the word “correspondence” I hope to attenuate my 
claim. 
19 If it appears that I speak ambiguously of qualia in this paragraph it is because I am trying to remain agnostic about what sort of 
entity it is. I hope to provide a picture that can be married with any picture of what kind of entity qualia are. 
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states of being aware of heat, though in the imagined scenarios the states are caused by 
stuff that is not truly heat. However, according to Kripke, such explanations for the seeming 
contingency of “pain = C-fiber firing”, are not available, precisely because pain is a sensation, 
or in some fashion, being epistemically aware of one’s pain entails there always being pain.  
 
I would suggest that explanations for the seeming contingency are in fact available to 
the identity theorist. I would take what Kripke showed to be a failed explanation and slightly 
modify it to make it work. Instead of talking of qualitatively identical sensations or epistemic 
states arising in imagined scenarios, we should talk of a qualitatively identical awareness of 
sensations or qualitatively identical introspective epistemic states arising in imagined 
scenarios. By retreating further back into the mind, I can now say, for example, “pain = C-
fiber firing” is seemingly contingent in virtue of the fact that we can imagine scenarios in 
which qualitatively identical introspective epistemic states arise though caused by 
fundamentally different perceptual epistemic states20 (or sensations fundamentally different 
in their physical make up). This is more or less just to point out that my posited introspective 
system is separate in some important way from our perceptual system and that this distance 
allows for discrepancies to be missed or ignored by the introspective system’s report on the 
perceptual system.  
 
Kripke might try to make the claim that we do not need to posit a separate system to 
explain how we become aware of our sensations, outright denying my picture. He might 
claim we just spontaneously become aware of our sensations. But surely this will come at 
some serious costs. First, it seems that he might be forced to add our spontaneous 
awareness of qualia to the list of nomological dangler phenomena: our spontaneous 
awareness would have to be understood as some kind of brute fact of qualia, or perhaps 
only explainable in terms of Gods design when setting up the world.21 But beyond this, this 
auto-magical picture flies in the face of the following intuition the reader might share with 
me: if we need a perceptual system to become aware of external states of affairs, then by 
analogy, should not we assume by default that we also need an introspective system to 
become aware of internal states of affairs? In other words, should we really allow Kripke to 
so immediately collapse the notion of there being an introspective system any sort, physical 
or not? I do not think we should. For these reasons, I find this potential evasion costly and 
unappealing.  
 
To summarize then, I hope to have elucidated at least one aspect of the 
mysteriousness of qualia, and elucidated it with a story compatible with materialism. This 
story depicts us having some sort of blind-innersight that allows us to automatically 
distinguish and parse the inner states of our mind. Because this innersight is blind, that is, 
because its functioning is invisible to us, there naturally arises within us only a vague, 
inarticulable “what it is likeness” of an experience. As incredible as it may seem, we can very 
reasonably mark a strong correspondence between this naturally arising concept and some 
collection of physical concepts about our inner states, concepts built through a lengthy and 
third-personal process; it is reasonable to do so given that we can now explain away the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 I am construing “epistemic state” very broadly. An example of a perceptual epistemic state would be the sort of low-level awareness 
of external objects exhibited by goldfish, long-distance truck drivers and those with blind-sight. 
21 Saul Kripke, “Naming and Necessity.” Reprinted in Chalmers, David John. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary 
Readings. New York: Oxford University Press, (2002), 332. 
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feeling of there being an unbridgeable gap between our natural concepts of qualia and the 
foreign, third-personal concepts. The mysteriousness has been accounted for. Further, I 
would argue that because reductionist materialism is one of the most economical theories 
and because the mysteriousness of qualia can be explained, we should accept some form of 
reductionist materialism. Whichever physical terms with which we ultimately choose to make 
qualia intelligible, is not my concern, and far beyond my competence. For me, the goal was 
simply to open the path towards intelligibility, by accounting for the mysteriousness of 
qualia with a materialist picture.22 I hope to have done so, and having done so, I am 
confident the explanatory gap can be filled in: in many ways, the gap relied on the 
mysteriousness of qualia. Finally, I have suggested that with my materialist picture in hand, 
we might also dismiss Kripkeʼs modal argument: an explanation for the seeming contingency 
is perhaps available for the materialist after all.  
 
I cannot quite conclude here however: I must recognize at least one important 
vulnerability in my picture. Being a materialist picture, the picture must actually agree with 
neuroscience to some important degree. Whether this is the case or not, is unknown to me. 
However, I would not want to misrepresent my picture: I do not expect us to find in the brain 
a neatly delineated region labelled “reflexive-sight system”. I suspect the actual setup will be 
infinitely more complicated. I should also note that this reflexive-sight system might be more 
or less developed and ranging in complexity depending which systems we are studying 
(auditory, visual... etc.). In his forthcoming Pain: Perception or Introspection? Aydede has 
suggested that certain systems, such as our pain systems, are made up of a blend between 
perceptual and introspective systems: such cases will no doubt be particularly complicated. 
But so long as a picture relevantly similar to the simplistic one I have sketched is available, I 
believe materialism can mount a strong defence against the explanatory gap, using my 
picture as its foundation.  
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